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PANEL
SPLIT· PERSONALITIES: TEACHING AND
SCHOLARSHIP IN
NONSTEREOTYPICAL AREAS OF
THE LAW
REGINALD LEAMON ROBINSON*

This panel focuses on split personalities, something we have all
experienced and through which we have suffered. Part of what we
will focus on is teaching and scholarship in nonstereotypical sub
jects. We have an excellent panel with us today: Lisa Ikemoto will
talk about race, class, gender, and sexual orientation as they relate
to bio-ethics; Dorothy Brown will relate her comments to tax law;
Carlos Cuevas will relate his comments to bankruptcy law; and
Robert Wasson will relate his comments to general areas of law. I
teach Property and so I will make a few remarks about that topic
and also give you a little bit of personal history.
"Split personalities": I think that is an appropriate way of
framing what it is we have to experience when we enter the acad
emy. "Split," because in many ways we live our entire lives trying
to find that certain, sometimes very unsettled, space where we or
our many personalities have to exist. We are really trying to move
between what we want to be, what we feel we need to be, and what
people expect us to be. I think this conflict, in many ways, awaits us
when we enter the academy.
I thought it was interesting yesterday that Jenny Rivera was
talking about presente. 1 We had comments from the floor that
brought home the fact that when we show up, sometimes that, in
and of itself, is presente. I think it is even more clearly presente
when we show up and we have a commitment to doing something
more than just getting our students through what may be consid
ered a bar-related or doctrinal course.
* Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. B.A., 1981,
Howard University; M.A., 1983, University of Chicago; J.D., 1989, University of Penn
sylvania Law School.
1. "Presente" means "I am here."
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Not only are our personalities split because we have to live our
lives generally in that way, but they are split even more when we
enter the academy. Many of us are shocked and surprised at this
reality, and I can tell you, quite honestly, that I was not as fore
warned as some of the panelists. I had to experience it directly and
I can tell you it was very painful.
I think that in addition to split personalities, we are talking
about marginalized personalities. I want to talk about how that sort
of marginalization relates to the institutional culture in which we
find ourselves. I also want to relate marginalization to what stu
dents do when they react to us and push us into that very unsafe,
unsettled space where we have to quickly find what personality we
need in order to deal with our present circumstances.
So often I have heard Jerome Culp say, "All rules is local," and
that is so true. We will relate different experiences to you today.
Sometimes they will not fit perfectly with each and every institution
at which some of you are teaching (suffering may be a better word)
because every institution has its own degree of dysfunction, every
institution has its own way of expressing that dysfunction, and
therefore, every institution has its own way of trying to cope ade
quately with our progressive mission. This pedagogical approach
might, in many ways, unsettle what it is they are supposed to be
doing.
Let me talk about my experiences. I started teaching at Whit
tier Law School in 1991. About two years later, I was a visiting
professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law for a
semester and then at the University of Connecticut School of Law.
I have been on the faculty at Howard University for about two
years.
When I started teaching Property, I chose a textbook that did
for me what I really wanted to do, which was to introduce race and
gender in class. I also introduced sexual orientation issues through
hypotheticals because the textbook did not do this very well. I
thought that if I chose a textbook that had in it everything that I
wanted it to have, I would not have to import that material. I
would not have to have someone say: "This is Reggie's stuff." They
could look in the textbook and say: "Well, it must be a relevant way
of looking at the law because it's already in here." Singer's book on
Property2 was not on the market yet, so I taught out of Richard
2.
TICES

See JOSEPH
(1993).

WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRAC·
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Chused's textbook. 3
What I wanted to do initially was to frontload the course with a
lot of social theory and philosophy. So I chose hotbed radicals that
I thought would make the students all sort of boil in their seats
Kant, Pufendorf, Bentham, Locke, Demsetz, Posner, Marx (but just
a little bit), and then lastly, a very little Hegel. Well, they didn't like
it, and they said so loudly; the line outside the dean's office was two
rows deep, but I did it anyway. I then coupled that material with
issues on property-as-culture. I thought this approach was simple
material that the students needed to know because it was very im
portant to their understanding that, as our cultural expectations and
social needs change, so changes a property regime. As the old re
gime dies, a new one crops up. Our discussion ought to be about
whether or not it was a good thing to kill the old regime in light of
something new. How good is the new regime; does it create more
problems than it answers questions?4 Thereafter, we deal with the
history of property. Again, this material is fairly easy. As you
know, property has historical roots, and one of the cases I teach is
Dred Scott. s I thought it was important to ask, as the book does:
What is the appropriate subject of property law? In connection
with this case, you can also teach about life estates and remainders.
There is a wonderful footnote in the textbook that deals with that:
If you can divide a person up, what would it look like over time?6
You can also learn about the power to encroach, which is very im
portant when you are looking at what the duties of a life tenant
might be.7 Also, for many of us who have thought about it, we can
all agree that Dred Scott was an important forerunner to the Chi
nese exclusion cases8 which concerned the issue of who has the
right to determine what citizenship is. Good stuff for property law,
I thought-well, perhaps not.
Let me give you some sense about the kinds of reactions I got
from both my colleagues and my students. The first two things I
will read to you are paraphrased comments I received from my col
3. See RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY
(1988).
4. See, e.g., International News Servo V. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918);
State V. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc.
Change, Inc. V. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
5. Dred Scott V. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
6. See CHUSED, supra note 4, at 163 n.76.
7. See id. at 163.
8. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting V. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping
V. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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leagues. The first comment goes as follows: "Reggie, you can't
teach these students the way you were trained at Penn. These. stu
dents have special needs and are not that bright." Well I could not
argue with that statement because that would mean that I would
have to assume that I was just like the students. Although some of
the students were affluent, my roots are not very different from
many of the students at Whittier.
Second, I will paraphrase a conversation I had with a
colleague.
Colleague: "I really don't want to be different. If you're different
you get in trouble and I'm not sticking my neck out."
My response: "So what you're saying to me is that if I'm different
and if I get in trouble, you're not going to go to bat for me."
Colleague: "That's right, you're on your own."

The third example is from my student evaluations. Let me give
you the context in which these students were probably thinking
when they wrote these things to me-things that were quite painful.
This caption runs along the top of the page. It reads: "This page is a
nonconfidential page for comments, explaining your rating on the
previous page or any nonconfidential comments you would like to
make about the instructor for the course. This page will be avail
able to the Faculty Personnel Committee for use in decisions affect
ing the instructor." Now, with that in mind, they wrote the
following. One student wrote:
I don't feel that I'm learning the property laws and concepts that
I will need to pass the bar, etc. We spent a lot of time discussing
philosophers which don't seem to be relevant to the goals of the
students. Much time in class is also spent "arguing" points, an
endeavor which is needed as a lawyering skill but, perhaps, would
be better confined to a class of its own.

Scary! Next evaluation:
Professor Robinson uses a book that spells "Black" with a capital
"B" and "white" with a small "w," which is indicative of his gen
eral attitude of reverse discrimination. White students in this
class are made to feel gUilty for the injustices suffered by blacks,
while black students seem to be receiving preferential treatment
both inside and outside class.

I angst!
The fifth example before I get to my concluding remarks con
cerns a conversation with a subcommittee of our Personnel Com
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mittee. They had read these evaluations, and they wanted to find a
way to help me to be much more effective in class. Their view was
that if I wanted to be more "authentic" as a teacher, I must be
someone who understands that the mission is doctrinal-teaching
rules so that our students can ,be galvanized in the hard tools of
legal reasoning and so that they ultimately will feel comfortable
about passing the bar. They wanted to get rid of my "unauthentic"
personality ~hat was walking around the class asking ugly questions,
perhaps stupid, irrelevant questions, so that students would not
have to have angst about what they thought or did not think. So
they told me quite up front: "Don't teach Dred Scott; don't do it." I
was flabbergasted.
I had read an article before I came to Whittier. As a new pro
fessor, you get that packet containing a lot of idealized information.
You read it and say, "God, yes! I'll be just like that." I remember
reading a little article which basically said that if a dean ever came
into the class and instructed the professor on how to teach, the pro
fessor would quit on the spot and go find another job. I thought,
"Yeh, that's me!" Yeh, right! So I sat there, surprised and unable
to believe it when they told me not to teach Dred Scott. When I
asked them why, the only answer was that it will make the students
feel uncomfortable. I thought: "But isn't that precisely what I
ought to be doing? Shouldn't we make our students just a tad un
comfortable if we are going to be successful in good, effective, long
range teaching?" Answer: "No." I didn't listen to them-I taught
it anyway.
The last comment is also taken from a student evaluation and
went as follows:
I feel Professor Robinson is an excellent teacher who receives a
lot of criticism which I know is based on factors outside of prop
erty. Although we are in 1991, a lot of students just can't accept
a strong, positive African-American professor who is intelligent
and doing things differently. It's sad but true that racism is alive
and well at Whittier Law School.

I have used these examples, not only to foreshadow our subse
quent discussions today, but also to talk about the difficulties of
trying to be "authentic" and true to our teaching mission. That mis
sion must be based, not only on the important needs of the institu
tion, but also on the needs of the students directly in front of us and
on our own academic and intellectual survival.
Today, we have a panel who will perhaps discuss .the same

78

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:73

things I have discussed, but they will do so in different but equally
compelling ways. Just as Berta Hernandez left us with words asking
us to think about "the indivisibility of identity," let me just tell you
how I have learned to cope with who and what I might be other
than just a black person. I have yet to figure out exactly what that
means without retreating to history and present-day social policy,9
or to what it means to be a man.1 0 When I walk into a room and I
turn out the lights and I do not touch myself, although I do not see
what it is I might be, I still live-I still exist. This continued exist
ence means that much of what I am has nothing to do with what it is
I think I see or with what other people think they see in me. Thank
you.

9. See Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of
Race, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1986).
10. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM,
DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAW

120-125 (1991).
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LISA CHIYEMI IKEMOTO*

SOME TIPS ON HOW TO ENDANGER THE WHITE MALE
PRIVILEGE IN LAW TEACHING**

I.

ENDANGERING

I am a Sansei woman, a third generation Japanese American
woman. I was taught not to consider my identity as relevant to
legal analysis. And yet my Asianness, my femaleness, and some
times my lack of apparent (hetero )sexual orientation are relevant
to those who judge my abilities to teach law or to do legal scholar
ship. Jerome Culp has written about a double bind he has faced as
a Black law professor. White students compel him to state his cur
riculum vitae, to prove his right to teach a course to them. Yet Pro
fessor Culp's students also deny the credibility of the
autobiographical facts that he considers relevant-that he is "the
son of a poor coal miner."l His colleagues deny the relevance and
appropriateness of those facts.2 Perhaps similarly, most of my
teachers, my students, and my colleagues have denied, in various
ways, the relevance and appropriateness of meanings that I attach
to being a Sansei woman, a woman of color, and a member of the
communities of color; at the same time, they have retained the right
and the power to attach their own meanings to my race and gender.
I have been taught, more generally, that identity categories
such as gender (meaning non-male), race (meaning non-white), and
sexual orientation (meaning non-heterosexual) are usually irrele
vant in legal analysis. The exceptions to the general rule for deter
mining identity relevance come up in classes like constitutional law,
but only for the equal protection portion of the course, employment
discrimination, and any course which has the word "woman," "gen
der"
"critical"
'"race"
" "feminist" "discrimination"
, or sometimes,
.
I use the present tense in describing this general rule because the
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. Professor Ikemoto teaches Property,
Bioethics, Law & Medicine, Family Law, and Marital Property, and uses critical race
theory and feminist critical theory in her scholarship and teaching.
** The following version of the author's remarks has been edited and footnoted
by the author.
1. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teach
ing: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539,539,543 (1991).
2. See id. at 554.
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spirit, if not the letter of the general rule, still prevails as the norm.
This was brought home to me very recently.
I hesitated to finish this essay because many others have writ
ten about the reasons for and the methods of teaching the signifi
cance of race, gender, class, and other social categories in law, as
well as the experience of being a law teacher whose race and gender
make these categories issues in the classroom. 3 The points I wanted
to make were very basic, and seemed to me to be redundant at best.
But a colleague recently made a statement that I and others under
stood to suggest that teaching torts and other "non-race" courses
from a critical race theory perspective would somehow endanger
the students. There was, fortunately, an outraged response. Yet it
seemed to me that even among the outraged, the practice of includ
ing race, particularly from a critical race theory perspective, in a
"non-race" course, was desirable primarily as an alternative ap
proach; it would be fine as long as most of us taught the "normal"
way. While this view pays more respect to diversity values than a
strict reading of the general rule, it leaves the spirit of the general
rule intact. It preserves the power of those who claim the law is
socially and politically neutral to say when and how race, gender,

3. For a short and incomplete list of helpful articles, see Frances Lee Ansley, Race
and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1511 (1991); Taunya
Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 137 (1988); Patricia A.
Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Difference and Exploring
Connections, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 165 (1988); Ruth Colker, Teaching From a Feminist
Perspective: An Occupational Hazard?, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 153 (1993); Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education,
11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Culp, supra note 1; Judith G. Greenberg & Robert V.
Ward, Teaching Race and the Law Through Narrative, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 323
(1995); Peter Halewood, White Men Can't Jump: Critical Epistemologies, Embodiment,
and the Praxis of Legal Scholarship, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (1995); Angela P. Har
ris, On DOing the Right Thing: Education Work in the Academy, 15 VT. L. REv. 125
(1990); Bill Dng Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity,
Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993); Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge:
Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988); Margaret M.
Russell, Beginner's Resolve: An Essay on Collaboration, Clinical Innovation, and the
First-Year Core Curriculum, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. l35 (1994); Peter M. Shane, Why Are
So Many People So Unhappy? Habits of Thought and Resistance to Diversity in Legal
Education, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1033 (1990); Gerald Torres, Teaching and Writing: Curricu
lum Reform as an Exercise in Critical Education, 10 NOVA L.J. 867 (1986); Stephanie M.
Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 J.
LEGAL Eouc. 147 (1988); Donna E. Young, Two Steps Removed: The Paradox of Diver
sity Discourse for Women of Color in Law Teaching, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 270
(1996).
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and other social categories are relevant in the classroom and in the
law..
At the First Northeastern People of Color Legal Scholarship
Conference, we talked about how to teach race in courses that do
not fit into the general rule. In other words, we talked about how
to show the relevance of race in the formation and application of
legal rules that are not about race in any way that is obvious. In our
discussion, we assumed without saying so that race is not obvious in
most legal rules and in most law courses because white privilege is
the implicit, invisible norm. 4 It is the norm built into the rules.
And it is the norm built into the perspective we think of as the
normal way of teaching. I state this point now because I am writing
for a broader audience than the one attending the Conference. I
also want to say that it was refreshing not to have to justify the need
for the discussion; it was restful to be able to assume that we shared
certain conclusions. The lack of need to justify and the ability to
assume some shared perspective is part of what makes those who
embrace the general rule privileged in law and law teaching. It is
part of what privileges whiteness in law and law teaching. I believe
that when we reach the point that teaching race, gender, sexual ori
entation, class, and disability does not need to be justified, is not
considered alternative, and is valued for the meanings attached by
those not privileged by these categories, then we will be endanger
ing privilege itself.

II.

BASICS

Making race and other points of marginalization visible in a
law course is a lot of work. Take the reading materials, for exam
ple. A few textbooks now include materials that address race, gen
der, sexual orientation, class, and disability. For example, I use
Singer's text, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices,S in my
property course. I have used course materials that do not make
race and other categories explicit. In those courses, I have tried to
use classroom discussion to raise questions about how race might
have operated in a case, how gender norms shaped the formulation
of a rule, and so on. I might try to bring in facts that the judge, the
casebook author, or the rule edited out, and ask why those facts
4. See generally STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED:
BLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996).

5.
(1993).

How

INVISI

JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES
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about race were edited out. But in those courses, it feels, and un
doubtedly appears, that I am at odds with the materials. More im
portantly, the fact that I am at odds with the materials is likely to
appear as if I am imposing my personal views onto neutral materi
als. In other words, the reading materials, and the fact that most of
my colleagues are teaching that race is invisible, enables the stu
dents to attach their own meaning to my identity. Reading materi
als that raise the same questions I do legitimize my efforts to
address these questions. And in the best moments, the race of each
of us in the classroom becomes obviously valid.
I often put together my own course materials. Obviously, this
takes a great deal of time. It takes more time to compile readings
that expressly address race, gender, sexual orientation, and class
than it does to compile readings that express the "law-is-neutral"
approach. There are few published texts to use as models. You
have to critically evaluate the standard approaches to the course,
and rethink the topic in order to figure out how to make the social
issues apparently relevant. 6 In addition, you have to do extra re
search to identify and locate readings that accomplish those teach
ing goals. I say "extra research" because contextualizing the course
subject in a way that makes the social categories obvious often
means taking an interdisciplinary approach. As a practical matter,
that means cramming in a bit of history, sociological method, ~ci
ence, and other areas. I believe that this extra work has enhanced
my teaching and scholarship. But the fact that it takes so much
additional effort to add context and use an interdisciplinary ap
proach indicates how pervasive and deeply engrained acontextual,
separatist analysis is at law.
This work has costs. For example, the time it takes to rethink
the topic and put the reading materials together might be spent
writing articles that would get more credit at promotion and tenure
time, or perhaps, better salary increases. Teaching from an "alter
native" perspective often has political costs. My guess is that teach
ing from an "alternative" perspective can reinforce the authority of
those who teach the so-called "normal" way. Or the fact that you
6. Of course, it is a good idea to start by contacting others who might be teaching
the same course using a similar approach. Sharing ideas, reading lists, and syllabi saves
a lot of time. I recently found a very good article by Karen Rothenberg, someone I
know, about teaching bioethics from a feminist perspective. Had I talked with her ear
lier, I coul(j have saved myself time and benefitted from her wisdom. See Karen H.
Rothenberg, New Perspectives for Teaching and Scholarship: The Role of Gender in
Law and Health Care, 54 MD. L. REV. 473 (1995).
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are teaching that race and gender are relevant may be perceived as
threatening to the authority of others, as well as to the authority of
majority viewpoints. This can negatively affect both teaching evalu
ations and relations with some students and colleagues. You may
have to use political capital to defend your teaching. Or you may
simply lose your political capital.
Finally, this work takes a lot of emotional energy. As I have
indicated, your identity becomes an openly acceptable site of con
testation. The identities of everyone in the classroom, but particu
larly the identities of those marked different by our social
categories, become sites of contestation. Talking about race, gen
der, sexual orientation, class, and disability makes everyone uncom
fortable. Some react negatively and even harmfully to this
discomfort. And it is, in my experience, easier to do this work
badly than it is to do it well. I do not think that I have ever quite
succeeded in doing this work well; I have had a few good moments,
a lot of ineffective moments, and too many bad moments.
So why do I do this work? My personal reasons are fairly sim
ple and straightforward. One reason is accuracy. Showing that
race, gender, and other social norms shape the formation and oper
ation of law is descriptively accurate. That my colleagues and stu
dents may disagree with me at least raises the possibility that one's
understanding of how the legal system operates has political con
tent and is shaped by personal perspective and experience. A sec
ond reason is closely linked to the first that I mentioned. I hope
that some students will embrace a critical viewpoint and continue to
question the normative content and effect of the law in their other
classes and in their careers. A third very important reason for do
ing this work is to provide space and validation for those students
who already have a critical consciousness and feel marginalized in
their other classes because of that, and for those students of color,
women, gay men, and lesbians who experience the hostility and si
lencing of the white heteropatriarchal culture that operates in most
classrooms. Finally, I am trying to create space for myself within
the law school.
The "how to" part of my discussion is very basic. As I men
tioned, others have articulated both reasons for and methods of
making social norms visible in law. Certainly, there is a great deal
more to write about why and how we can teach law in the context
of social reality as experienced by those marginalized by it. But I
want to address a few "how to" points that are so basic, they seldom
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show up in print. To be as concrete as possible, I will use examples
from my bioethics course.

A.

Selecting Reading Materials

As I compile the reading materials for this course, I try to in
clude materials that describe and use the dominant bioethics analyt
ical framework, which is premised on liberal individualism, and
materials that critique that framework. For the latter, I use read
ings to provide contextual information that raise questions about
assumptions within the dominant approach, and I use readings that
do critical analysis. For example, the first set of readings examine
the doctrine of informed consent. In that group of readings, I in
clude a few standard cases to describe the legal doctrine, a study
that compares European-Americans, African-Americans, Mexican
Americans, and Korean-Americans, and shows that cultural and ra
cial differences among these groups mediate understandings of au
tonomy and methods of medical decisionmaking. 7 I also include an
excerpt from the President's Commission report on health care de
cisions that documents how the same medical information carries
different weight with patients depending on how it was presented,S
and excerpts from Sue Fisher's book, In the Patient's Best Interest, a
linguistic study that reveals the effects of gender, class, education,
and expertise in structuring obstetrics/gynecology doctor-patient
relations. 9
During classroom time, I try to use these materials to discuss
whether, and how, the legal concept of autonomy that premises in
formed consent might be gendered and ethnocentric in construction
and application. I also discuss how race, gender, class, education
levels, the physical setting (typically it is a clinic, hospital, or doc
tor's offices, the doctor's domain), and the use of language can
structure doctor-patient relations. I refer to Sue Fisher's concept of
the contextual web, and we draw the web on the chalkboard as a
group exercise. I often tell about how I experienced a cervical can
7. See Leslie J. Blackhall et aI., Ethnicity and Attitudes Toward Patient Autonomy,
274 JAMA 820 (1995); see also Barbara A. Koenig & Jan Gates-Williams, Understand
ing Cultural Difference in Caring for Dying Patients, 163 W.J. MED. 244 (1995).
8. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS:
THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT
PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP, vol. III (Oct. 1982); see also Sara Fritz, Patients Seldom
Pick Their Treatment, Professor Finds, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at A29.
9. See SUE FISHER, IN THE PATIENT'S BEST INTEREST (1990).
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cer scare that I had as a result of a positive pap smear, and the
conversations I had with my doctor about the diagnosis and treat
ment process that followed. I try to talk about how my race and
gender and that of the doctor (white, male) mediated these events,
so that the links between my personal story and readings become
obvious. I use the account to try to demonstrate the relevance of
personal experience and how personal narrative can be used as an
analytical tool. I try to encourage students to use their experience
as more than an anecdote, but at the same time, I try not to pres
sure them to reveal personal information.
During our panel discussion, Professor Robinson suggested
front-loading the readings with a group of theory materials. This is
an effective approach, but currently I take a different approach. I
mix the readings on theory throughout the course materials. I take
this approach in part to show that theory, context, and legal doc
trine are not separate categories of legal work. I also do this be
cause it makes the theory less intimidating and more digestible for
those students who resist theoretical analysis. In addition, I simply
find it difficult to discuss the theory without the contextual
materials.
B. Selecting Students
I am less interested in having students who have a pre-existing
interest in the subject matter of the course than in having students
who are willing to engage in conversation about how racism, for
example, might or might not operate in the legal rules we are study
ing, without being obstructive or oppressive. I do not (and cannot)
directly select the students enrolled in the courses I teach. I do try
to start the semester in a way that accomplishes two things. I try to
make it clear that we will be engaging in critical inquiry that ad
dresses how race, gender, class and other social categories operate
at law. I review the course syllabus and open a substantive discus
sion during the first class so that this approach is on the table at the
outset. In this way, I hope to encourage those students who are
resistant to critical thinking to either open their minds or drop the
course.
In bioethics, I have taken two different tacks in choosing an
mentioned, I usually begin the course with
opening discussion.
the informed consent materials. Since the students are already fa
miliar with the doctrine and have had personal experience as pa
tients, the topic is easy to broach. In other semesters, I use material
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that makes many students uncomfortable. I might use a topic that
is unfamiliar or sensitive. Or, as discussed below, I have used Mary
Shelley's Frankenstein. lO While most students are familiar with the
story, they are unaccustomed to using a literary text in law school.
There may be some students who think this is simply too strange,
too unsettling, too non-doctrinal for them. If they are not willing to
be unsettled, I hope they drop the course.
I try to set a tone for open, critical, and constructive engage
ment, but at the same time, I also try to make it clear that we are
not going to discuss whether racism, patriarchy, heterosexism, and
other systems of subordination exist. I try to convey that we can
talk about how racism expresses itself, how it harms or privileges
individuals, groups, and ourselves, and whether racism is operating
in a particular situation. Hopefully, this starting point weeds out
hostile students. II
If your goal is to speak to the unconverted, then you may not
want to take this approach. You may want to target those students
who are consciously or unconsciously hostile to inquiry that ques
tions the assumption of legal neutrality, either for the purpose of
raising their consciousness or for the purpose of using them as foils.
As I mentioned, my priority reason for doing this work in the class
room is to provide a space for students marginalized in other areas
of legal education. I do not try to provide a space with no opposi
tion, just one with smaller margins.
C.

Exposing Norms

I try to start each of my courses with a discussion that exposes
how consistently and unconsciously we bring social norms to bear in
analytical thinking. My initial goal is to begin a conversation in
which we learn how to recognize and articulate the operation of
these norms. My larger goal is to prompt students to think about
how legislators, judges, lawyers, and we ourselves create and apply
law with normative content. I start with simple examples. In
bioethics, I often use Mary Shelley's Frankenstein as a text for be
ginning this discussion. As a preface to the discussion, I tell the
students that many regard Frankenstein as the first story, or the
10. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS (Maurice
Hindle ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1818). I usually assign the introduction, written by
Maurice Hindle, as well as the story.
11. In the worst case scenario, a hostile student may decide to remain in the
course for the purpose of actively obstructing critical inquiry.
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genesis, if you will, of the science fiction genre. I provide a bit of
background information about Mary Shelley and the romantic era
in which she wrote. I then ask the students to break into small
groups to discuss a series of questions: How are "science," "na
ture ," "scientist"
" "law" "human"
, "civilization"
" "man" and "wo
man" portrayed in the novel? We then regroup as a class to report
and further discuss the questions. In the context of the novel, the
students seem to have no trouble identifying and addressing the
normative content of the concepts I have asked about. During the
large group discussion, comparisons to contemporary understand
ings of these concepts inevitably arise. In the best conversations,
we are able to begin raising questions that suggest ways in which
scientific knowledge is socially constructed.
The story of Frankenstein works particularly well to identify
ways in which patriarchy and racism affect social relations. For ex
ample, while the humans in the story are white and for the most
part Swiss, the creature is clearly an outsider. Students are usually
able to identify racist norms in how Mary Shelley depicts the crea
ture; she consistently describes him as "dark." The female charac
ters are mostly morally good, hyperfeminized according to
contemporary standards, and lack depth relative to the key male
characters in the story. These points can be used to raise questions
of how race and gender affect our understanding of what it means
to be "human."
I tell the students the reasons I use Frankenstein as a text.
Frankenstein is often used as a metaphor in public discussions about
science and medicine. I want the students to feel free to use such
metaphors, to use popular culture in class, but to do so in a way that
evaluates their role and identifies their normative content. I ask the
students to think about the role of stories in ethical, policy, and
legal analysis, and I ask them to identify other writings that might
serve as texts for bioethics. I also ask the students to consider this
question in the context of a bioethical dilemma they are probably
already familiar with, such as surrogacy. I try to surface stories
about mothers, fathers, family, and the lines between natural and
artificial that have been embedded in both the public debate and
the legal analysis of surrogacy. While this might sound clear and
coherent in print, typically the classroom discussion is very unstruc
tured and confusing to some. My hope is that the substance and the
structure (or lack thereof) of the discussion will loosen up precon
ceptions about law and medicine, ethics, analysis, and the social re
lations embedded in each of these concepts.
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CONCLUSION

I think it is probably clear that how I teach springs directly
from who I am-a Sansei woman, a woman of color, a member of
the communities of color. I have not always taught this way. Nor
does my experience of racism, heteropatriarchy, and economic in
justice inform every aspect of my world view or my teaching. In
many respects it is easier to teach a doctrinal, liberal realism per
spective only; that perspective is acceptable and familiar and there
fore, safer and easier. Teaching critical inquiry can be controversial
and emotionally exhausting. I am always trying to overcome fear of
causing controversy, insecurity about the effectiveness of my teach
ing methods, and a desire to take the less strenuous route (i.e., basic
laziness). But I tell myself that if everyone likes what you are doing
as a teacher, you are either doing something wrong or the world has
changed, and right now, the former is more likely.
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BROWN*

SPLIT PERSONALITIES: TAX LAW AND CRITICAL
RACE THEORY**
The following is a mythical conversation:
[FOURTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: I don't think that there can be a
black legal income tax law or a black economics separate from
white economics. Should blacks have additional deductions to
take account of racism? Or should there be a longer period for
blacks to file their returns because many of their ancestors were
slaves?
[JEROME CULP]: I don't know if blacks should have more deduc
tions than whites, I haven't made a detailed study of how the in
come laws impact blacks.
[FOURTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: Not enough is known. Certainly,
we could help to do more and better studies on blacks and income
taxes, but I take it that is not Black Legal Scholarship.
[SECOND WHITE COLLEAGUE]: There aren't very many blacks
who teach tax law or do research in that area. Is that part of your
point?
[JEROME CULP]: Yes. But my point is more complex. My tax col
leagues have stated these arguments in their most negative terms.
There may be a [sic] income tax problem that would benefit from
being viewed in a black perspective, but until you look, how will
anyone know? To what extent have our tax laws been distorted
now and historically by the question of slavery and continuing
racism?1

Although the above conversation never took place, it had a
profound impact on my thinking. When I read Professor Jerome
Culp's challenge,2 I knew that it was one which I had to accept.
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.S., 1980, Ford
ham University; J.D., 1983, Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M., 1984, New
York University School of Law. lowe a tremendous thanks to Mr. Mark Carozza and
the Institute for Policy Research for their excellent research support. I would also like
to especially thank Professors Karen Brown and Mary Lou Fellows for their continued
support and encouragement. I dedicate this work to Professor Jerome Culp, whose
vision created the space for this work.
** The following version of the author'S remarks has been edited and footnoted
by the author.
1. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Origi
nal Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39,101. The quoted material is "[a] mythical con
versation in Duke Law School Faculty Lounge shortly after Toward a Black Legal
Scholarship was completed and circulated." Id. at 99.
2. See id. at 105 ("everyone has to do black scholarship if it is to succeed").

90

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:73

Ever since that day, I have dedicated myself to exploring issues of
race and ethnic origin in my tax courses and scholarship. The focus
of this speech will be federal income taxation, or the tax treatment
of individuals. More specifically, this speech will focus on both the
marriage penalty'paid and the marriage bonus received by married
couples.
I have been thinking about these issues since 1991, yet I have
just begun to write about them. That is a function of the classes
that I have taught over my brief five years in the legal academy. I
taught Partnership Tax for three years and was unable to unmask
the racial and ethnic issues in that course. I taught Deferred Com
pensation once and didn't really attempt to unmask those issues,
since my scholarship interests lie elsewhere. It wasn't until the fall
of 1994 when I began teaching the courses I wanted to teach,
namely Tax Policy and Federal Income Taxation, that I put on my
"race lenses," as Professor James Hackney has described it, and
went looking to unmask the racial implications of the federal in
come tax system.
Unmasking racial and ethnic issues in the federal tax laws is a
difficult and arduous task. Very few scholars have attempted to
publish in this area. 3 I understand why that phenomenon has oc
curred. First, tax law has a myth about it that suggests that it is
different than other areas of the law. 4 My tax colleague at Cincin
nati, Professor Paul Caron, has eloquently referred to this phenom
enon as "tax myopia," and observed that there are "serious
consequences caused by the ... myth that tax law is somehow dif
ferent from other areas of the law."5 One such consequence is per
3. But see Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in
TAXING AMERICA 45, 45-57 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (dis
cussing the differences between black and white households concerning their payment
of the marriage penalty or their receipt of the marriage bonus); Beverly I. Moran &
William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REv.
751 (discussing the differences between black and white households concerning the tax
treatment of wealth); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996)
(acknowledging the differences between black and white women that previously have
been ignored by tax scholars).
4. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to
be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994).
5. Id. at 518. See also Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The
Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
637,637 (1996) (Wherein author observes: "I previously have criticized what 1 call 'tax
myopia'-the tendency of the tax law to view itself as an isolated body of law separate
from other areas of law." (footnote omitted». Additional authors have also observed
the tax myopia phenomenon. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax, in TAXING
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petuating the myth that tax law is neutral and ·objective. To the
extent that tax law is assumed to be different, it is not examined the
way other areas of the law have been examined through racial and
ethnic lenses. 6 To the extent that tax law is assumed to be different,
any disparate impact based upon race or ethnicity will continue un
abated. My scholarship is dedicated to forever eradicating the be
lief that tax law is somehow different, that it has no differing impact
based upon race, ethnicity, or any other characteristic. 7
Taxation is the result of a body of law including congressional
statutes, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the
"Code"), interpretive agency pronouncements, and judicial deci
sion-making. 8 Given that description, it is no surprise that tax laws
will have differing impacts based upon race, gender, and other de
fining characteristics. Knowing that race matters and proving that
race matters, however, are separate endeavors.
In order to unmask how race operates in the tax laws, I had to
begin outside of the federal tax laws. I have consulted historical,
political, and sociological materials, to name a few. I have become
relentless in the pursuit of information. I find myself talking to
complete· strangers on airplanes the minute I find out that they are
involved in one of the above-mentioned areas. I have found ob
taining information in those areas just as difficult as it has been un
masking the racism that operates in the tax laws.
I believe that there is an important story to tell, just with re
spect to the difficulty of obtaining information. For example, the
Internal Revenue Service does not keep tax return data by race. 9 I
am not suggesting that it is a good idea for revenue agents to know
the racial or ethnic identity of a taxpayer when deciding when to
AMERICA, supra note 3, at 25, 26 (Stating that "tax fictions can be dangerous. They can
mask underlying motives and biases and they can cause unforeseen hanns.").
6. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 539; Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419
(1991).
7. Legal scholarship exists on the relationship between sexual orientation and tax
law. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW &
SEXUALITY 97 (1991).
8. See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUC
TURE AND POLICY 6-14 (1995).
9. Telephone Interview with John Kaminsky, IRS Statistics Branch (Nov. 8, 1996)
(stating that the IRS does not ask for any racial identity infonnation).
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audit that taxpayer. What I am saying is that if I cannot uncover
data as to who pays taxes by racial and ethnic identity, I will never
be able to rise to Professor Culp's earlier challenge. The good news
is that the Census Bureau collects more data than you will probably
ever have time to analyze. It is that data base and an angel in the
form of Mark Carozza, who works at the Institute for Policy Re
search at the University of Cincinnati, that have enabled me to do
the preliminary work that I have done.
The United States Census Bureau collects household informa
tion data by race and ethnic identity. The Bureau's individual
records are available in the Public Use Micro-Data Sample. As I
state in my forthcoming book chapter entitled The Marriage Bonus/
Penalty in Black and White, I found that black couples are more
likely to pay a marriage penalty and white couples are more likely
to receive a marriage bonus,lo The marriage bonus/penalty analysis
is a result of the convergence of three different factors, namely: how
the Code is written and interpreted; the employment discrimination
experienced by black workers and white women in the labor mar
ket; and the differing marriage rates of black and white women.
Let us examine each in turn.
First, the tax laws. The disparate impact of the marriage bo
nus/penalty is attributable to three tax principles. The Code allows
married couples to file joint returns. l l Husbands and wives can al
locate up to one-half of their income to a non-working spouse and
have that assigned income taxed at a rate lower than if that spouse
were single. 12 That lower tax liability is referred to herein as a mar
riage bonus. The Code rewards those families whose income is
earned by only one spouse.
Alternatively, if husbands and wives both work, and earn
roughly equal amounts, they will pay taxes as a couple that is con
siderably higher than those they would pay as single adults,l3 That
higher tax liability is referred to herein as the marriage penalty.
The Code penalizes those families with two wage earners. I would
note that for purposes of the Code, who is married and eligible to
10. See Brown, supra note 3, at 45. Although a more complete analysis would
take into account racial and ethnic differences affecting Hispanic-American, Asian
American, and Native-American families, the book chapter was a preliminary step in
that direction.
11. See I.R.C. § l(a) (1994). Joint returns are not mandatory and the alternative
of filing "married filing separately" is available.
12. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 8, at 138.
13. See id. at 139.
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file a joint return is determined by reference to state law. 14 That
makes same-sex and opposite-sex couples only eligible for joint fil
ing status if recognized as married under state or local law.
The second tax principle that is a factor in this analysis is that
the Code taxes income at progressive rates. As a result, the mar
riage penalty is the highest on the two-income family that earns
roughly equal amounts of income. Is The second wage earner's first
dollar of income is added on top of the spouse's salary and taxed at
the spouse's highest marginal tax rate. The second wage earner
does not receive the benefit of the lower tax rate that was applied
to the spouse's first dollar of wage income. Progressive tax rates
penalize the second wage earner. Alternatively, to the extent that
there is only one wage earner in the household, progressive tax
rates coupled with the joint tax return provisions afford that house
hold a marriage bonus.
The third tax principle is that the judiciary allows the value of
services, such as child care, provided by family members to the
household to go untaxed. I6 As a result, those three principles result
in marriage tax penalties and marriage bonuses. A married couple
can pay a higher tax when they marry or receive a reduced tax lia
bility when they marry. The Code is not marriage neutral, and as
previously mentioned, my research indicates that the marriage pen
alty couple is more likely to be black, and the marriage bonus
couple is more likely to be white. This is not because the Code
explicitly limits its penalties to blacks and bonuses to whites, but
because the Code operates in the context of larger societal issues. I
will next address those larger societal issues, namely employment
discrimination and differing marriage rates.
I will focus on two aspects of employment discrimination, spe
cifically, wage discrimination and differing labor participation rates.
First, "[f]or every dollar earned by a white man, a white woman
earned 78¢, a black man earned 74.8¢, and a black woman earned
66¢."17 Second, the labor force participation rates of married wo
men differ according to race. In 1990, "73 percent of married black
14. See 4 BORIS I. BfITKER & LAWRENCE LoKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF IN
COME, ESTATES AND GIFTS '11111.3.6 (1992); Cain, supra note 7, at 97; Toni Robinson &
Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Deter
minant,8 VA. TAX REV. 773, 792-95 (1989).
15. See John Brozovsky & A.J. Cataldo II, A Historical Analysis of the "Marriage
Tax Penalty," 21 ACCT. HISTORIANS J. 163, 166 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 3, at 1576.
17. Brown, supra note 3, at 52 (footnotes omitted).
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women were in the waged labor force, compared to 64 percent for
married white women. "18 The labor force participation rates for
men have declined over the past twenty years, but this decline has
been greater for black men than for white men,19
Finally, we observe differing marriage rates. Thirty-six percent
of black women· and sixty-eight percent of white women were in
married-couple households in 1990.20 Assuming that taxes affect
behavior, including the decision to marry,21 could the tax laws be
operating in a way that discourages black women from marrying
and encourages white women to marry? Additional empirical work
needs to be done, but I suggest that it will yield some fruitful
results.
Now we are ready to examine how the convergence of the tax
principles, employment discrimination, and differing marital rates
result in black couples being more likely to pay a higher marriage
penalty and white couples being more likely to receive a marriage
bonus. As a result of wage discrimination, black men and women
earn wages closer in amounts than white men and women. This
assumes, however, that black men marry black women and white
men marry white women. Given that interracial marriages are still
rare, this is a safe assumption. 22 In addition, more black married
women are in the labor force. Accordingly, black couples ar~ more
likely to have household income split roughly equal. Given that the
greatest marriage penalty exists in households where two wage
earner couples earn equal amounts, married black couples, with a
higher percentage of two wage earners, with salaries closer than
white couples, are more likely to pay a marriage penalty than white
couples.
Yet an additional factor in the analysis is that most black wo
18.
19.

Id. at 49.
See id. at 51. The decline in labor participation rates for younger, white men
has been attributed to advanced educational opportunities. See BETTE WOODY, BLACK
WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE: IMPACTS OF STRUcruRAL CHANGE IN THE ECONOMY 147
(1992).
20. See Reynolds Farley, The Common Destiny of Blacks and Whites: Observa
tions about the Social and Economic Status of the Races, in RACE IN AMERICA 197,212
(Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993).
21. See James AIm & Leslie A. Whittington, Does the Income. Tax Affect Marital
Decisions?, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 565,571 (1995) (finding that "the probability of marriage
falls as the marriage tax increases").
22. See Robert O. Wood, Marriage Rates and Marriageable Men: A Test of the
Wilson Hypothesis, 30 J. HUM. RESOURCES 163, 172 (1995) (reporting that "in 1985,
98.9 percent of black married women and 96.6 percent of black married men had a
black spouse").
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men are not married, and most white women are married. There
fore, most black women receive neither the marriage penalty nor
the marriage bonus. Recall the question I posed earlier: Does the
Code playa role in the marriage decision? As heads-of-house
holds, black women are disproportionately poor. 23 Eighty percent
of families headed by black women were in poverty, while fifty-five
percent of families headed by white women were in poverty.24
White men and women earn wages further apart in amounts.
Therefore, even if they pay a marriage penalty, it will not be nearly
as great as black couples. Given that 74.8¢ is closer to 66¢ than 78¢
is closer to one dollar, black couples are more likely to pay a higher
marriage penalty than white couples.
Is it just a coincidence that the most penalized married couple
would be that of a black man and a white woman? Seventy-eight
cents is even closer to 74.8¢ than those wages of a black married
couple. In that household, however, white women would make
more than their black male husbands.
As a result of wage discrimination, white males earn the high
est salaries. One dollar can buy more than the 74.8¢ black men can
earn. White men can more economically afford to provide for their
families based upon their salaries alone. Accordingly, white wives
do not have to work for the family to survive economically, and if
they do work, they will receive less wages, again a result of employ
ment discrimination. Those two instances of discrimination, cou
pled with the exclusion from taxable income of the value of the
services that wives provide for the family, provide incentives for
white women to work inside the home, and for the family to receive
a marriage bonus. 25 As noted earlier, we observe that married
white women are not in the labor force to as great an extent as
married black women.
Although far more research needs to be done, it seems clear
that the Code has a different impact on black and white households
where both marriage penalties and marriage bonuses are analyzed.
Although the Code did not cause the societal racism that results in
employment discrimination and differing marriage rates, the Code
is operating to exacerbate that racism by penalizing black couples
and benefitting white couples. Accordingly, the Code's role in rein
forcing societal racism must be challenged and eliminated.
23. See Farley, supra note 20, at 213-17.
24. See id.
25. See Brown, supra note 3, at 53.
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I will conclude with a brief discussion of how I teach sensitive
issues involving racial and ethnic identity. First, I have only re
cently begun to explore issues of race and tax law, and anticipate
incorporating some of these ideas in my Tax Policy course this Fall.
What I have always done in Tax Policy that has met with the most
resistance, however, is to critique the print media. I generally find
newspaper clippings on relevant tax topics, and proceed to rip apart
the newspaper articles in class. I encourage the students to do the
same. What I have observed is that those who agree with the Wall
Street Journal don't like it when I rip the Journal's views apart, and
those who agree with the New York Times don't like it when I rip
apart the Times's views. Yet, by the time the semester is complete,
I find less resistance, given that I am an equal opportunity criticizer.
I manage to annoy all of my students. That's when I know that I
have had a good semester. As an aside, I also know whether I have
had a good semester outside of the classroom by counting the
number of colleagues that I have managed to annoy. In the five
years that I have spent in the legal academy, I have had an ex
traordinary number of good semesters both inside and outside of
class.
In my State and Local Finance course, which I have taught for
five years, I spend a few weeks carefully examining education fund
ing cases. Those cases involve issues of race and ethnicity, taxes
and education-a fairly volatile mix. So it is important that I set a
respectful tone early in the semester, which I do by inviting stu
dent's views, but challenging them to unmask their underlying as
sumptions-but doing so with the utmost respect for those
assumptions. I find students are as respectful to you as you are to
them.
In the early part of the State and Local Finance course, we
don't touch upon racially sensitive matters, but we do touch upon
politically sensitive matters-which are often just as volatile. At
the first class, we discuss which branch of government the student's
fear the most: the federal, state, local, or judiciary. When students
respond (and they do respond) I seek to get them to understand
that their colleagues' views are just as important, and just as biased
as their own. The biases come out slowly, but they come out. I
usually unmask the biases by challenging their underlying beliefs. I
ask, "What is your cite for that proposition?" When they concede
that they have no cite, but that it is based upon personal observa
tions, that is an important moment in class. I ask them if they can
understand how that might not be persuasive to those with different
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experiences, different personal observations. How will you reach
them? What if those with different experiences are the judges con
sidering your client's case? How can you best represent your client
given the judiciary's bias? Of course, this assumes that we spend a
good part of the semester critically evaluating the court's decisions.
Students react in a variety of ways to the process, however.
They tend to be rather cynical by the time I get them and actually
enjoy shooting at judicial decisions. They tend to like this exercise
less when the judge has the same bias that they have, although
rarely do they see it as a bias until a colleague points it out in the
class discussion. They usually resist. I don't try to change their
minds. I just ask, "Do you see how your belief is formed upon an
assumption that others may not share? That if you continue to
make arguments based upon that unshared assumption you may
lose your audience?" That is the most that I can hope for. I have
however, had the gratifying experience of having my students come
to me after the semester is over and say that I made them think
about things they never thought about. It is such moments that
make this process worthwhile.
To summarize, I recommend putting your race lenses on, re
lentlessly exposing the disparate impact that your intuition tells you
is there in whatever subject you teach, and surrounding yourselves
with .scholars· that are supportive of your work. Thank you and
happy hunting.
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CARLOS CUEVAS*

My name is Carlos Cuevas and I teach at New York Law
School. Before I begin my comments, I would like to thank Profes
sor Leonard Baynes and Western New England College School of
Law for hosting this Conference and my colleagues for letting me
participate in this interesting panel.
I teach Article 9, which encompasses secured transactions,
bankruptcy, and corporate reorganization. The first time I taught
the bankruptcy course, it was during the day and I had approxi
mately 50 students. For the last three years my bankruptcy course
has been basically sold out. My average day enrollments have been
110 for bankruptcy and secured transactions, which are both elec
tives at my school. I also teach a seminar in corporate reorganiza
tion which has an enrollment of 25 people.
I start the beginning of each course by writing a phrase on the
board: THE PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE. The reason I put that
phrase on the board is to let the students know that I am there
because I want to be there. I take my job very seriously and the
same expectations the students have of me, I have of them. We are
in a special profession. Although you may not think that you deal
with life and death, at some point in time you will. Therefore, you
have to learn how to do the smallest task, as well as the most impor
tant task, to the best of your ability. This point deals subliminally
with the competency issue. From the moment I get to the class
room, I want the students to know that I take my job very seriously
and that I am not the so-called "token" on the faculty.
I also deal with teaching materials differently. You see, unlike
property law, for which a text that dates from 1940 would for the
most part be basically modern, the areas of the law in which I teach
evolve rapidly. I revise my course materials for corporate reorgani
zation and for bankruptcy every six months because the law in
these areas basically evolves every six months. I want students to
know that I am teaching them what is current.
The other thing that I try to do in the classroom is to set a
tenor that encourages dialogue, and to engage students in that dia
logue. The first time I taught corporate reorganization, there was
one person of color in the classroom. Now, my average enrollment
of people of color is between 20 to 25 percent. I think that one of
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A., 1979, New York University;
J.D., 1982, Yale Law School.
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the reasons I have been successful is that I call on people. I do not
want there to be silent voices in the classroom. I want the students
to know that they have paid their money just like everyone else and
they are entitled to a decent education, and to the best education I
can give them. For example, I use the Socratic and hypothetical
methods of instruction. When I get a good student of color or a
good woman student, I ask them to play the role of judge. I want
these students to know that they do not have to playa subservient
role; that no one in my class has to playa subservient role. I want
them to know that not only in my class, but in life, they can become
a judge like Judge Johnson, and that they too can ascend in the
legal profession.
The question is: What are you doing in your classroom to break
down the myths, not only of society in general, but also of
academia? Just to give you an example: The wife of one of my for
mer research assistants is attending another law school, and he ex
plained to me that she feels very frustrated because she raises her
hand in class but is never called on. That is the worst thing you can
do because you are saying, "this person does not exist." Well, we
all exist, and we all have something to contribute. My students of
color who are not on law review could end up working for legal
services where they may be plaintiff's counsel in a class action.
They all have something to contribute and they all have something
to give.
I think that the fact that I can teach commercial courses and
have a high enrollment is very important because he or she who
controls the money in this society controls a lot. If you do not con
trol your own money, then it is questionable whether you are really
empowered in this society. Therefore, I would like to think that my
course, in addressing commercial financing, is linked to empower
ment. I am from New York and I know that my colleague Ms.
Brown is also from New York. There are a lot of black, Latino and
Asian small businesses in New York. Well, is it not time that we
started servicing this community so that it can have access to attor
neys who are competent and are sensitive to its issues?
You see, I generally view myself as a mentor to my students.
My goal is to help them develop into good attorneys, to start engag
ing them in the dialogue, and to show them that we are not only
engaged in an academic experience but also in a lifelong experience
of development. If someone says something that is really incorrect,
but they are acting in good faith, I will say, "Well, would you really
say that to a judge? Would you really say that in that manner?" I
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do this because I want my students to know that in a couple of
months they will be getting paid for this and that when they make
mistakes, it is not going to be a matter of getting an A or a B in my
course. Litigation is a zero sum game, either you win or you lose,
unless you settle.
I do not raise the topic of race in class because, as Ms. Brown
said, no one files a statistical check concerning race or ethnicity
when you file a bankruptcy petition. You really would not want
that because you would not want a judge to have access to that type
of information. But the one thing I can discuss is the issue of class,
and the reasons certain rules are made. One of the things that I
bring to the discussion is public choice theory. Public choice theory
discusses who makes the rules and why those rules are made. It
discusses the nature of the legislative process because, after all, the
voluminous statutes I deal with do not appear in the United States
Code accidentally. They appear there because they perpetuate cer
tain classes and certain economic groups. One of the things I try to
say to my students is, "Imagine you are in a fictional country and
you are making rules for commercial law. How would you make
those particular rules and who would want them?" This exercise
prompts the students to think about class and class structure.
The one thing I try to do, and I think this is more important
outside the classroom, is to explore the possibilities. I try to tell
people, "if you have a dream, pursue that dream," because I want
students to know that they do not have to settle for mediocrity.
They can put their best foot forward and eventually they can be
come judges, United States Attorneys, and they can also clerk. I
think one of the problems is that there are not enough minority law
students who become clerks, even though they have the capability.
So, I try to be a mentor to them, and to encourage their aspirations.
There is a point that Ms. Brown and I both talked about: We
have a schizophrenic identity because we are people of color, yet
we teach in the business area. If I have one area of resentment it is
that I do not want to be told how to think about certain issues. Let
me be an individual and respect me as an individual. That is why I
am in the academy. You can only tell me what to think if you have
hired me as your attorney and I am your advocate. In that circum
stance I breach my fiduciary duty to you if I take an opposing posi
tion. The reason I have become an academic is that I am able to
have academic freedom to engage in serious intellectual discussion.
I think that we, as people of color, are in a bind at times because we
are told that we cannot take a certain position because it may not
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be the "liberal" position. The real question is, what is the intellec
tually correct position? The same issue arises with respect to aca
demic support of people of color on law school faculties.
Sometimes you are the "Lone Ranger," but the question is whether
you want to be the "Lone Ranger" or sacrifice your soul? That
dilemma is something that we face all the time, and that is why
conferences like this are so important. Here, we have the ability to
garner the support of our colleagues and discuss these issues in a
free manner. I thank you for this opportunity, and I thank you for
listening to me.
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ROBERT P. WASSON, JR.*

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS BY PANELIST ROBERT P.
WASSON, JR., ON SPLIT PERSONALITIES:
TEACHING AND SCHOLARSHIP IN
NON-STEREOTYPICAL AREAS
OF THE LAW**
Good morning. My name is Bob Wasson, and I would like to
thank the organizers of the First Annual Northeastern People of
Color Legal Scholarship Conference for inviting me to serve as a
panelist on "Split Personalities: Teaching and Scholarship in Non
Stereotypical Areas of the Law." To that end, I have been asked to
make some introductory remarks.
,
Like the topic for our discussion, I, too, share a split legal per
sonality, with one side of that personality in "stereotypical" areas of
the law and the other in "non-stereotypical" areas of the law. The
"stereotypical" aspect of my legal personality is reflected in the fact
that I share the "stereotypical" background of law school teachers
by having graduated from Harvard Law Schoo1. 1 I wanted to be a
litigator and clerked as a summer associate at two "stereotypical"
large corporate law firms: Kirkland & Ellis in Chicag02 and Willkie,
Farr & Gallagher in New York. My "stereotypical" experience con
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., 1976, Harvard Col
lege; J.D., 1979, Harvard Law School; Fulbright Lecturer, 1991-92, Faculty of Law, Uni
versity of Nairobi, Kenya.
** The following version of the author's remarks has been edited and footnoted
by the author.
1. See Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profes
sion: An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
191, 227 (1991) (reporting that during the 1988-89 academic year, 13.0% of all law
school faculty had graduated from Harvard); id. at 194 & n.19 ("Five of the nation's 175
law schools [Harvard, Yale, COlumbia, Chicago, and Michigan] graduated nearly one
third of all law professors teaching today."); Donna Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile
of the Teaching Branch of the Legal Profession, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 501,507
(finding that 13.9% of all law professors teaching during the 1975-76 school year had
graduated from Harvard Law School); Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The
Double Minority; Empirical Evidence of a Double Standard in Law School Hiring of
Minority Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2299, 2323 (1992) ("More than one sixth of the
[minority] men (15.8%) and women (15.9%) graduated from Harvard Law School, the
largest supplier of law school faculty members in the country."). Merritt and Reskin
report that their findings were remarkably consistent with these earlier studies. In their
full population, including both minority and white professors, 13.3% of the faculty
members had graduated from Harvard. See id. at 2323 n.95.
2. At the time I clerked at Kirkland, during the summer of 1977, it was reported
to be the sixth largest law firm in the country with 160 attorneys between its Chicago
and Washington, D.C. offices.
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tinued upon graduation from law school by working as a litigation
associate at Reuben & Proctor in Chicago, a spin-off of Kirkland &
Ellis, and later, at another large corporate law firm, Goodwin,
Procter & Hoar in Boston, my home town. 3 When I arrived at Suf
folk, I was asked to teach two "stereotypical" law school courses,
Federal Civil Procedure and Federal Courts, which, fortunately, re
lated directly to my area of practice.
The "non-stereotypical" aspect of my legal personality is re
flected in the fact that I teach Jurisprudence,4 Legal Philosophy,5
and a course on Sexual Orientation and the Law. 6 In 1992, I served
as Chair of the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS")
Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues. I was also appointed by
the AALS to serve on a "Working Group" to draft guidelines for
implementing an AALS bylaw barring member schools from dis
criminating on the basis of sexual orientation. Finally, almost all of
my scholarly writings have been in this area.7
I have only a few points to make, first, because the excellent
3. Having grown up as an Air Force "brat," the term "home town" is somewhat
of a misnomer. However, to the extent that I have lived in the Boston area since 1963,
with the exception of two years in Chicago and another in Kenya, Boston is the closest
that I have to a horne town.
4. This course grew out of my experience as a Fulbright Lecturer with the Faculty
of Law of the University of Nairobi, Kenya, in 1991 to 1992, where I taught Jurispru
dence in a seminar format to a small group of graduate students (including a retired
member of the Kenya High Court), and to 170 undergraduates in a lecture format. As
most of you are undoubtedly aware, with the exception of the United States and Can
ada, law is an undergraduate concentration.
5. Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy are essentially the same course. As stated
in Cohen and Cohen's Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy:
Jurisprudence, as the jurist's quest for a systemic vision that will order and
illumine the dark realities of the law, and legal philosophy, conceived as the
philosopher's effort to understand the legal order and its role in human life,
have come close enough together in our land and our generation to warrant a
unified approach to these two overlapping fields.
CoHEN AND COHEN'S READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, at xvi
(Philip Shuchman ed., 2d ed. 1979).
6. In order to reduce any student anxiety that might be created in having a course
entitled "Sexual Orientation and the Law" on their law school transcripts, the course is
listed in the law school catalogue as "Civil RightsINon-Traditional Families." This step
was taken with the advice and counsel of the law school Registrar.
7. See Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Overview ofAIDS Discrimination Law after Arline,
in 4 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 225 (Bar
bara M. Wolvovitz ed., 1988); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Law and Development in the Third
World: Ensuring Protection for the Rights of Criminal Offenders, in 1 LAW AND DEVEL·
OPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 184 (Yash Vyas et al. eds., 1994); Robert P. Wasson, Jr.,
The AIDS Crisis as an Impetus to Law Reform in the United States and Kenya, 17 SUF.
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1 (1994); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., AIDS Discrimination Under
Federal, State, and Local Law After Arline, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 221 (1987).
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comments of my fellow panelists make an extensive elaboration of
my points unnecessary, and second, because it is important that
members of the audience be given sufficient time to pose questions
to the panel. To begin with, one needs to write, period. In this
regard, it makes no difference whether one writes in traditional or
non-traditional areas of the law. 8 There are two reasons for this.
First, if you wish to advance at your present institution, you need to
write, and there is no substitute for it. 9 As Professor Derrick Bell
so succinctly stated:
Of course, the sense of many in the law school community
that teachers of color gained their jobs by virtue of affirmative
action policies rather than by meeting traditional measures of
merit does not deter assignment of every imaginable representa
tional role. "We knew you would want to serve on this commit
tee, work with the minority students on their annual conference,
speak to this black student who is having trouble with torts, and
mediate the differences between the minority students and Pro
fessor X who inadvertently told a racist joke in class."
The list is endless and would easily occupy the full time of an
assistant dean. And yet such extracurricular duties are seen as
part of the minority teacher's job ... until, of course, the time
arrives to evaluate the teacher for promotion and tenure. Then,
the entire focus of review is on the quality of the teaching and
8. But see Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal
Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1992) (highlighting the inherently subjective nature
of evaluating legal scholarship).
9.· One of my colleagues was the only person of color on a law faculty of 50. This
person was placed on a university-wide affinnative action committee and was exten
sively involved with the recruitment and retention of minority students and with serving
as an official and unofficial advisor to minority organizations and students. Neverthe
less, this individual received no credit for these activities when the time came for pro
motion from assistant professor to associate professor to full professor.
1\\'0 other professors of color at another law school were similarly saddled with
minority-related activities. In addition, they served on such weighty faculty committees
as faculty hiring and curriculum. One even served as chair of a faculty committee even
though this person was untenured. Notwithstanding the fact that both were popular
with their colleagues and received good student evaluations, neither received tenure.
However, the reason given to me for the denials was that one had produced no schol
arly writings and the other had produced only a final draft for which publication in a
middle-ranked law review was pending. It was reported further that his piece was criti
cized by colleagues who taught in the individual's area of expertise for being "unorigi
nal" and for having "gone over well-plowed ground." One might ask how many of us
produce an initial piece of the originality of a Harvard Law Review Supreme Court
Forward. One might also ask how original or insightful were the original pieces of the
critics. See Carl Tobias, Engendering Law Faculties, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143, 1152-53
(1990) (stating that many law schools consider service to the law school and to the
broader community as the least important tenure criterion).
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writing. Either no allowances are made for the compromises to
scholarly activity resulting from time devoted to racial represen
tational roles, or the estimates made for such activity wholly un
derestimate both the time and energy expended in trying to
compensate single-handedly for the school's inability to create a
decent learning environment for students who for so many years
were entirely excluded or admitted under the token policies now
utilized to hire black and brown faculty.10
Second, if you wish to transfer to another institution, you must
have scholarly writings out there. It doesn't matter that one is Mr.
or Ms. Chips in the classroom.l1 One is simply not going to get a
lateral hire on the basis of one's classroom teaching. It is sort of
like the old philosophical question: "If a tree falls in the woods and
no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?" The answer is
that if there is no one there to hear it, "Who cares?"
Classroom teaching has no lasting reputation beyond the fad
ing recollections of present and former students who actually heard
it. Over time, those memories fade and soon there is nothing left.
Scholarly writings, by contrast, have an immortality that is con
tained in the index to legal periodicals, Lexis, and Westlaw.12
There are three identifiable approaches to scholarly writing,
which are not mutually exclusive. The first is to write generally in
the area or areas in which one teaches in order to develop a reputa
tion and expertise in a field of law. The second is to write generally
in the area or areas in which one has an interest. One may do so for
personal satisfaction or in order to develop a reputation and exper
tise in a field of law. The third is to write specifically on the issue or
issues that one sees as being financially remunerative. This mayor
may not be in the area in which one teaches. It mayor may not be
. to. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Application of the "Tipping Point" Principle to Law
Faculty Hiring Policies, 10 NOVA L.J. 319, 320-21 (1986); see also Richard Delgado,
Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV.
349, 355-56 (1989) (describing the almost "intolerable" demands for the one or two
minority faculty at law schools to be available to any and all minority students and
minority issues).
11. See JAMES HILTON, GOODBYE MR. CHIPS (J934). This classic story of a Brit
ish schoolteacher who becomes a strict authoritarian in the classroom only to later
regain his natural compassion as an instructor was made into an academy award win
ning motion picture. See GOODBYE MR. CHIPS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
12. As a gay African-American man without children, I look upon my scholarly
writings as my children. Like children who grow up to have children, and so forth, they
are a legacy that continues forever. Similarly, so long as the index to legal periodicals,
Lexis, Westlaw, or similar indices exist, I, too, shall have achieved a form of
immortality.
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in an area in which one has a particular interest. Since the goal is to
make oneself marketable, one would certainly wish to develop a
reputation or expertise in such a field.
.
In my case, I could have written in the areas in which I first
started teaching-Federal Civil Procedure and Federal Courts
which were the areas in which I had practiced prior to teaching law.
In fact, I had surmised that Judge Bork would· be nominated by
President Reagan for the next appointment to the Supreme Court.
As it turned out, Judge Bork was nominated just as I completed the
first draft on an article that compared his judicial philosophy on the
bench to that expressed in his famous Indiana Law Journal article
on neutral principles of law. 13 Once Judge Bork's nomination to
the Court was rejected by the Senate,14 the article was mooted. I
thought of turning to a more "stereotypical" piece, like the one on
Bork, but came to be drawn to writing on discrimination based on
HIV status as more and more of my friends, associates, and former
lovers began to die from AIDS.1s
Some may ask whether or not there are any disadvantages to
writing in a "non-stereotypical'" area. In my view, there aren't
any,16 As people of color, we already have several strikes against
us. First, notwithstanding the dearth of minorities at most law
schools,11 and the large pool of qualified minorities,1S it is claimed

13. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). This article, in tum, was based on an even more famous piece by
Herbert Wechsler. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Wechsler's article responded to Judge Learned
Hand's Lectures at the Harvard Law School in which judicial review was legitimized as
merely a necessary inference to "'prevent the defeat of the venture at hand.'" Id. at 1-3
(quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (1958) (reprint of the Oliver Wen
dell Holmes Lectures)).
14. See Linda Greenhouse, Bark's Nomination is Rejected 58-42; Reagan 'Sad
dened,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1987, at 1.
15. At this point I don't know how many have died of AIDS. I stopped counting
once the number reached 50.
16. But see Rubin, supra note 8 (highlighting the subjectivity inherent in evaluat
ing legal scholarship).
17. See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women
on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 539 (1988). Chused reports
that:
Racial tokenism is alive and well at American law schools. About one-third of
all schools in this study have no black faculty members. Another third have
just one. Less than a tenth have more than three. In percentage terms, less
than fifteen percent of law schools have more than six percent of their faculty
positions held by black people.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Chused adds that "[o]nly about one-fourth of law schools surveyed, a total of
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that we simply are not "out there."19 We are viewed as incompe
tent affirmative action hires who diminish the likelihood that com
petent white men will be hired. 20 This is particularly so with respect
to minority women. 21 Second, too often the term minority is
thirty-nine schools, have more than six percent of their faculty positions occupied by
minority persons." ld. at 540. He concludes:
There were only thirty-five more tenured black professors in 1987 at the 144
non-minority-operated schools in the sample than there were in 1981. This
represents an increase of only about one-quarter of a person per institution.
The number of tenure track black professors increased by only sixteen in the
same time period, or about one-ninth of a person per institution.
ld. at 540-41.
18. See Cheryl I. Harris, Law Professors of Color and the Academy: Of Poets and
Kings, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 338 (1992) (addressing the "myth" of a lack of quali
fied minority law professors); Merritt & Reskin, supra note 1. Merritt and Reskin re
ported that more than one-sixth of minority hires graduated from Harvard Law School
and that nearly another sixth graduated from Yale Law School. See id. at 2323.
Roughly 20% of the minorities served on the main law review at their school and an
other 15% served on the secondary law review. See id. at 2324. Finally, nearly 30% of
the minorities clerked for a judge following law school, with roughly 25% of these hav
ing been with a federal judge. See id. at 2325.
By way of comparison, approximately one-third of all law professors graduated
from Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Chicago, or Michigan. See Borthwick & Schau, supra
note I, at 194 & n.19. Approximately 50% of men and 40% of women hired as law
faculty during the 1980s had law review experience. See id. at 205, 206. Finally, 36% of
the men and 44% of the women hired as law faculty during the 1980s had some kind of
judicial clerkship following graduation from law school. See id. at 208.
19. See Chused, supra note 17, at 555 (arguing that aggressive commitment must
be undertaken by American law schools to recruit and hire minority and women
faculty); Bell, supra note 10, at 321 (no aggressive search for minority candidates is
made until the law school administration is pressured to do so by minority students and
liberal white faculty, and once such an effort is undertaken, qualified minorities are
miraculously found).
20. See Karen Skelton, Bay Area Law Schools Hiring More Women and Minori
ties, AM. LAW. MEDIA, Mar. 7, 1991, at 1 (quoting Dean Paul Brest of Stanford Law
School, who stated: "It's not a good day for white males. I'm glad I have my job
here."). Such a comment might only be partially justified as an overreaction to those
who have deemed the dearth of minorities to justify racial quotas in the hiring process.
See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, The Need for Self-Imposed Quotas in Academic Employment,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 137; Charles R. Lawrence III, Minority Hiring in AALS Law
Schools: The Need for Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 429 (1986).
21. See Merritt & Reskin, supra note 1. Notwithstanding the assumption that
women of color would command a premium in law teaching because they "simultane
ously satisfy student and faculty demands for female professors and for minority ones,"
id. at 2300, Merritt and Reskin discovered that minority women who joined law school
faculties between the fall of 1986 and the spring of 1991 "began teaching at significantly
lower ranks than the minority men, obtained positions at significantly less prestigious
schools, and were significantly more likely to teach low-status courses like legal writing
or trusts and estates." Id. at 2301. Furthermore, "[njone of these disparities can be
adequately explained through differences in credentials, age, work experience, geo
graphic constraints, or family ties. Instead, law schools seem to treat minority women
less favorably than minority men." ld; see also Tobias, supra note 9, at 1145. Tobias
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viewed as synonymous with African-American to the disadvantage
of non-African-American minorities. 22 Third, law schools are often
hostile environments, leading to the high turnover of minority
faculty for more congenial environments.23 Finally, because stu
dents often view the minority law professor as an affirmative action
hire, h~ or she is not accorded the presumption of competence ac
corded to white professors.24 As a result, the minority law profes
sor faces a larger risk of being trashed in the student evaluation
indicated that problems of recruiting and tenuring are not limited to minority females
by pointing out that approximately 20% of law schools, particularly the so-called "elite"
law schools, comprise over 25% of a "laggard group" of schools where the percentage
of women during the period from 1986 to 1987 was substantially less than the 1981 to
1982 average of 12% female. Id. at 1145 & n.ll. Tobias identified these "elite" law
schools as the same ones listed by Richard Chused in his study published in the Univer
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review, namely: University of California at Berkeley, Univer
sity of California at Los Angeles, University of Chicago, Columbia University, Cornell
University, Duke University, Georgetown University, George Washington University,
Harvard University, University of Illinois, University of Michigan, University of Minne
sota, New York University, Northwestern University, University of Pennsylvania, Uni
versity of Southern California, Stanford University, University of Texas, Vanderbilt
University, University of Virginia, University of Wisconsin, and Yale University. See id.
at 1145 n.12 (citing Chused, supra note 17, at 549 n.65); see also, Carl Tobias, Respect
for Diversity: The Case of Feminist Legal Thought, 58 U. CiN. L. REV. 175 (1989)
(listing Harvard University, University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University as having
some particularly nasty battles over the granting of tenure to women).
22. See Merritt & Reskin, supra note 1, at 2316 ("Among the minority professors,
73.5% were African American, 16.2% were Hispanic, 7.7% were Asian American, and
1.7% were Native American."); see also Chused, supra note 17, at 538 (reporting that
the Hispanic proportion of majority-run faculties went from 0.5% during the period
from 1980 to 1981 to only 0.7% in 1986 to 1987, and that the proportion of other minor
ities went from 0.5% to 1.0% during the same period); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans:
The "Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,51 (1994)
("Whereas approximately 3.5% of law students are Asian American, only approxi
mately 0.9% of law faculty are Asian American."); id. at 52 n.230 (in 1988, for example,
only one out of 313 newly hired full-time facuIty members was Asian American); Mary
Ann Brigantti-Hughes, Underrepresentation in Law Schools of Puerto Ricans, Latinos is
Appalling, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 1992, at S4 ("Of the 5,700 law teachers in the 180 accred
ited law schools in the nation, five are Puerto Rican, 20 are Mexican-American, and 10
are other Latino.").
23. See Chused, supra note 17, at 544-46. The alienation of minority faculty
members may be illustrated, in part, by a comment made by Derrick Bell:
It is not easy to describe the feeling of despair when the faculty rejects a quali
fied teacher of color who you know full well they would quickly hire were you
to suffer a heart attack and drop dead. "Is it," the minority teacher wonders,
"that I am doing such a good job that they see no need to hire others like
myself? Or is it, rather, that my performance is so poor that they refuse to hire
anyone else for fear of making another serious mistake?"
Bell, supra note 10, at 322; see also Harris, supra note 18, at 343.
24. See Bell, supra note 10, at 320.
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process2S or of having students complain about his or her teaching
either directly to the professor26 or to the administration. 27 These
problems are exacerbated to the extent that the administration
treats any and all complaints by white students against minority
professors as legitimate,28 rationalizes student evaluations to serve
a racist purpose,29 or dismisses unfavorable student evaluations of
white tenure candidates favored by the administration and
faculty.3D
25. See Delgado, supra note to, at 361.
26. See id. at 359 (discussing submission of a memorandum by a first-year white
male student which reviewed the minority law teacher's classroom performance, noting
his deficiencies and giving suggestions on how the teacher, who had come to law teach
ing following an impressive career in law practice, could correct them); id. at 360
(describing student delegation's visit to a Hispanic professor in which the professor was
criticized both for moving too fast and for moving too slow through the course
material).
27. See id. at 353 n.14. Delgado described an incident in which Derrick Bell, a
leading African-American scholar,
taught Constitutional Law as a visiting professor to a section of first-year law
students at Stanford. After a few weeks, the professor was invited to give a
lecture in a noon "enrichment" series on constitutional law offered at the law
school. Unknown to the professor, the faculty had initiated the series in re
sponse to complaints from his students over the way the course was being
taught.
[d.
28. At three separate law schools with which the author is familiar, the Dean
himself listens to student complaints by white students. He is sympathetic to their con
cerns and indicates that the patient (the minority professor) does indeed suffer from a
serious pathology and has a faint pulse, but that the situation will be monitored to
. determine whether or not he or she will survive.
29. At one law school, a minority tenure candidate's student evaluations were
reviewed. The evaluations were generally good. The faculty then compared the evalua
tions with those of other faculty who taught the first-year course. Although each
faculty member receives a computer print-out of how their student evaluations compare
to those of other faculty members as a whole, there is no official attempt to compare a
professor's student evaluations to those of other professors who teach the same course.
Furthermore, this law school's tenure policy did not even indicate that such compari
sons would be made. Unless the minority tenure candidate was advised privately in
advance that such a comparison would be made, she would have had no way of knowing
that her generally good student evaluations would be used against her in this ad hoc
manner. At this point, the fact that the minority professor's evaluations in the first year
required course were marginally lower than those of colleagues who taught the same
course was cited to urge a negative tenure vote. By contrast, a senior faculty member,
convinced that the candidate was not properly teaching her upper-level elective, dis
missed her uniformly superior student evaluations with the comment, "these are stu
dents, they don't realize that they are not being taught anything." The woman was
ultimately denied tenure by the faculty at this meeting.
30. See Delgado, supra note 10, at 361 ("[W]hen white males get low numbers,
they may be over-looked or explained away: 'Joe got poor numbers in Civil Procedure
because he is so rigorous; and what do students know anyway?''').
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It should be added that the so-called "non-stereotypical" area

in which I write is now so mainstream, and there are now so many
straight men and women who write in it,31 that it would almost be
tragic for someone who has an interest in it to avoid the area be
cause it is just "too" non-stereotypical.
Let me make just one final point. Mentoring is important. We
all need support and encouragement instead of criticism. Unfortu
nately, colleagues at your respective home institutions who will sit
in judgment of you when it comes time for promotion and tenure
will dismiss the fact that each page of your draft was marked "First
Draft," and will forever damn you as the person who cannot write.
To avoid this, I offer myself as someone willing to review your
pieces. The fact that I don't teach in the area of your research
should not be a problem. 32
Thank you for your time and enjoy the rest of the conference.

31. For example, one of my colleagues, a married, straight, white man just com
pleted an excellent law review article on using Title VII to fight same-sex sexual harass
ment. Someone was prescient to name my AALS section the "Section on Gay &
Lesbian Legal Issues" as opposed to the "Section for Gays & Lesbians" as an incredibly
large portion of our membership is comprised of straight men and women for whom our
concerns are leading edge and not fringe esoterica.
32. Except for this paper, the author generally asks his father to review his drafts.
The author's father was in the Air Force for 29 years and, thereafter, served for 15 years
as vice-president of the New England region for a high-tech company. He is a non
lawyer but a fairly intelligent person. He is also the author'S biggest fan. He has never
failed to pick out faulty logic, strident emotionalism, and mistakes of sixth grade gram
mar that the author is wont to make.

